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Executive Summary 
During a country wide survey undertaken by Swiss Foundation for Mine-action (FSD) 
between 2003 05 it was determined that approximately 50 km2 of land was contaminated 
with mines and Un-exploded Ordnance (UXO). However, during the past 5 years, various 
activities such as Land Release (LR), Technical Survey (TS) and Clearance, has reduced the 
SHAs level to approximately 15-17 km2. UNDP hired Dr Robert Keeley of RK Consulting 
Ltd (the „Consultant‟) to undertake an Outcome Evaluation of the Country Programme 
Action Plan (CPAP) 2005-2009, Outcome # 6 to “Create a sustainable national institution to 
plan, coordinate and implement comprehensive mine action.” The Consultant identified four 
key issues recurring in the literature and in initial discussions with key informants. These 
were: 
 
 Institutional Framework issues 
 The need to scope the problem and develop an exit A review of technical survey and 
land release techniques that will be critical in meeting clearance targets in the context 
of Ottawa Convention commitments 
 The potential for a shift of focus and scope for Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
 
Detailed findings, conclusions and recommendations are set out in the main body of the 
report. However key findings are: 
 
 The landmine problem in Tajikistan can be seen in two distinct elements; a mid-term 
requirement to clear minefields and a long term, residual requirement to deal with isolated 
reports of unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
 Work is going reasonably well and much has been done to establish a coordination body, 
the Tajikistan Mine Action Centgre (TMAC) with implementation being done by a 
partnership between the Swiss Demining Foundation (FSD) and the Ministry of Defence. 
 TMAC should be recognized as a „directly executed‟ (DEX) project given its dependence 
on UNDP support. Its lifespan can be limited to the length of the landmine clearance 
project which is estimated (by the Consultant) at 10 years at current planning levels 
 The UXO contamination should be dealt with by a sustainable capacity within the 
Committee for Emergency Situation and Civil Defence (CESCD) established by a train 
and equip project with recurrent operational costs then being met by the government. 
 The landmine problem in Tajikistan can further be broken down into areas that have 
socio-economic impact and those that don‟t have such an effect. Donors are more likely 
to support the former, and the report contains an overview of techniques that could be 
used to identify the scope of the problem in economic terms. It may be possible to 
establish a trade-off with stakeholders whereby donors help clear the high-impact areas 
whist the government of Tajikistan undertakes to fund the clearance of the remaining 
areas towards the end of the program life. 
 There are a number of techniques being used in Tajikistan to help improve productivity. 
The Consultant endorses the technique known as “land release” but recommends a 
workshop to review the efficacy of the technique known as “technical survey” in 
particular its dependence on a partial sampling of suspected hazard areas. 
 There is a working mine risk education (MRE) program largely undertaken by the 
Tajikistan Red Crescent Society. There is room to re-evaluate the MRE program in detail 
to establish just how much effort should be made and the relative effort spent in either 
mass communication techniques or community-based approaches. 
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During a country wide survey undertaken by Swiss Foundation for Mine-action (FSD) 
between 2003 05 it was determined that approximately 50 km2 of land was contaminated 
with mines and Un-exploded Ordnance (UXO). However, during the past 5 years, various 
activities such as Land Release (LR), Technical Survey (TS) and Clearance, has reduced the 
SHAs level to approximately 15-17 km2.  
 
TMAC estimates that by means of LR, TS and manual mined area clearance, Tajikistan could 
clear all the SHAs by early 2015. Therefore, the overall mine risk in Tajikistan is contained 
but will require several more years to eradicate. It is unlikely that Tajikistan will be able to 
meet its obligation as signatory to the International “Ottawa Treaty” to eliminate all known 
mines by 2010.  
 
TMAC and Partners 
 
The Tajikistan Mine Action Center (TMAC) was established in June 2003 by agreement 
between the Government of Tajikistan (GoTaj) and UNDP. TMAC oversees all aspects of the 
mine action programme in Tajikistan in collaboration with the mine action operators, relevant 
ministries, local authorities/communities and in consultation with UNDP. Although TMAC 
operates under a National Execution (NEX) modality, UNDP closely monitors and controls 
finances, human resources, international travel and procurement related tasks of TMAC.  
 
FSD are currently the only active international organisation working on landmine clearance 
in Tajikistan, though OSCE are also assisting in capacity development and training of EOD 




Original Terms of Reference (TOR) 
 
UNDP hired Dr Robert Keeley of RK Consulting Ltd (the „Consultant‟) to undertake an 
Outcome Evaluation of the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) 2005-2009, Outcome # 
6 to “Create a sustainable national institution to plan, coordinate and implement 
comprehensive mine action.” This evaluation will cover the period from the start of the 
current CPAP in 2005 to the present. The scope of consultancy shall include the following 
components of the mine action programme in Tajikistan and include recommendations for 
improvement or changes for future guidance:  
 
1. Undertake a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analysis on the 
existing working modalities between UNDP and TMAC and make appropriate 
recommendation for improvement and/or amendments given the prevailing circumstances. A 
draft UNDP TMAC Programme Document (2009-2011) may be a good starting point to 
review the working modalities;  
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2. Undertake a SWOT analysis on the performance of TMAC as a national entity to oversee 
all aspects of mine action programme in Tajikistan and its perceived role to represent the 
programme in all relevant national and international events. Review TMAC‟s organizational 
structure and capacity of TMAC staff in order to make specific recommendations for 
improvement and/or amendments. A relevant document to review in this respect is the 
findings of a recent SWOT analysis done on TMAC by the International Capacity Building 
Consultant (1st April – 30th September 2008) ;  
 
3. Review the commitments and/or tangible initiatives of the GoTaj in addressing its mine 
action problems and make recommendation for UNDP to pursue with the GoTaj for increased 
national ownership and/or contributions. 
 
 4. Under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention Tajikistan is obligated to eliminate all known 
mines by April 1, 2010. Given the existing resources with and/or the commitment of FSD, 
MoD, OSCE, UNDP and GoTaj, is it feasible to clear all the SHAs (32 km2) by 1st April 
2010. If not, how much more resources would be needed and how to get it .  
 
5. Review the Mine Action and Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW) integration process in 
Tajikistan and make recommendations for improvement and/or amendments.  
 
Methodology used in the evaluation 
 
The methodology used in the evaluation consisted of three distinct techniques: 
 
 Review of existing literature and documentation. A list of key documents is included at 
Annex A. It consists of documents provided by the UNDP Country Office and documents 
obtained during the evaluation by the Consultant. 
 
 Stakeholder interviews. A cross section of stakeholders were interviewed using informal 
or „semi-structured‟ interview techniques. The five main groups of stakeholders were:  
 
o Tajikistan government agency representatives 
o Donor representatives 
o UNDP country office staff 
o TMAC personnel 
o Implementing agency personnel 
 
A list of all of the institutions represented in these interviews is at Annex B. 
 
 Field trip. A field trip was undertaken by the Consultant to Vanj on the Tajik-Afghan 
border.  
 
The draft report was then returned by the Consultant for review and comment by the UNDP 
Country Office in Tajikistan. As agreed in the review of the Inception Plan, the draft 
amended in the case of any factual errors discovered during the review process and took note 
of other comments from TMAC.
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OECD Development Evaluation Criteria 
 
The organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has developed a set 
of evaluation criteria for development projects
1
. These criteria and their definitions are 
reproduced in Table 1 below and are used in this evaluation. 
 
 
Table 1: OECD Development Project Evaluation Criteria 
No. Criterion Definition Rule of Thumb 
1 Relevance The extent to which the aid activity is suited to 
the priorities and policies of the target group, 
recipient and donor 
Does it fit development 
and/or poverty reduction 
plans? 
2 Impact The positive and negative changes produced by 
a development intervention, directly or indirectly, 
intended or unintended. This involves the main 
impacts and effects resulting from the activity on 
the local social, economic, environmental and 
other development indicators.  
Does it have a positive effect 
on the intended 
beneficiaries? 
3 Effectiveness A measure of the extent to which an aid activity 
attains its objectives. 
Does it meet its targets? 
4 Efficiency Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and 
quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an 
economic term which signifies that the aid uses 
the least costly resources possible to achieve the 
desired results. This generally requires 
comparing alternative approaches to achieving 
the same outputs, to see if the most efficient 
process has been adopted. 
Does it meet its targets in a 
cost-effective manner? 
5 Sustainability Sustainability is concerned with measuring 
whether the benefits of an activity are likely to 
continue after donor funding has been 
withdrawn. 
Will the government take on 
funding? 
 
Results of initial documentation review and stakeholder analysis 
 
The Consultant identified four key issues recurring in the literature and in initial discussions 
with key informants. These issues have been discussed with UNDP Tajikistan staff and it has 
been agreed that concentrating on these four key issues in the evaluation will provide 
sufficient insight into the landmine situation in Tajikistan and the resources currently 
available to address it. These four key issues, and their attending research questions, are 
described below. 
 
1. Institutional Framework 
 
 What is the actual structure of the TMAC project (DEX or NEX)? 
 What are the implications of formalizing a DEX modality? 
 Which elements of activity should remain in TMAC core business and which (if any) 
should be hived off to other agencies? 
 What are the options for getting more government ownership of the project now and in 
the future?  
 Which government department may be suited? 
 What requirements are there for capacity development within TMAC? 
                                                   
1
 See the OECD introduction to Development Evaluation at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html which offers definitions 
of the criteria used in development project evaluation. 
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 Are there efficiency measures from including mine action under the disaster management 
portfolio within UNDP? 
 What technical assistance might UNDP staff require in the future? 
 How should UNDP and TMAC best interface with OSCE activities in Tajikistan? 
 
2. Scoping the problem and exit strategy for UNDP and international funding 
 
 What is the actual remaining landmine and UXO contamination problem in Tajikistan? 
 When is this expected to be cleared at current rates? 
 What are the means by which prioritities for clearance are set? 
 What is the significance of an „impact free‟ interim target for Tajikistan?  
 How can „urgent‟ (or „acute‟) landmine clearance needs be combined with dealing with 
„long term‟ (or „chronic‟) needs for an explosive ordnance disposal/SALW capacity?  
 How can the scoping concept be reconciled with institutional framework issues 
considered above in #1? 
 Recommendations for separate projects within future mine action portfolios 
 Recommendations for further studies in scoping 
 Recommendations for response time analysis of mobile EOD teams 
 
3. Technical survey and land release techniques 
 
The achievement of increased productivity in recent years depends on the efficacy of recent 
techniques by FSD in the areas of land release and technical survey. Meeting Ottawa targets 
with existing resource levels depend on their use. However, both of these concepts involve 
removing (parts of) SHA from the database without subjecting them to full clearance and 
both of these techniques can be controversial in the humanitarian mine action community. 
The safety and suitability of these techniques (as used and documented in Tajikistan) will be 
reviewed by the Consultant and recommendations made if necessary. 
 
4. The potential for a shift of focus and scope for Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
 
If time allows, the Consultant will review the methodology and message used by the TMAC 
MRE component for effectiveness and relevance, and examine existing data in order to assess 
efficiency and impact. The Consultant will then make recommendations on the future scope 
of MRE in Tajikistan, including ideas on how to interact with the mobile EOD/SALW 
requirement. 
 
Note on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) issues 
 
In the original TOR the Consultant was asked to look at the potential for UNDP/TMAC 
involvement in SALW issues. Literature review and stakeholder analysis suggests that the 
SALW problem in Tajikistan is not significant in terms of actual weapons, however it is 
likely that there will be a problem in abandoned ammunition and UXO. It was agreed in the 
discussions of the Inception Plan it was agreed that the appropriate approach to ammunition 
and UXO should be discussed in the context of developing a sustainable Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) capacity in Tajikistan and all subsequent discussion of SALW responses in 
this Report is done in this context. 
 
UNDP Tajikistan Mine Action Evaluation January 2009 
































Figure 1. Mined areas of Tajikistan (source: TMAC). 
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There are two main points that should be made during a presentation of an overview of the 
findings of an evaluation. 
 
Firstly, the program as a whole is working quite well. A coordination capacity (TMAC) has 
been established and is largely effective in achieving its tasks. It is entirely nationally-staffed 
and its staff have demonstrated a good capacity. A mine clearance capacity has been 
established with the creation of an effective partnership between FSD and te MOD, and 
demining is underway, with increasing efficiency and output every year over the five years of 
operations. Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Mine Victim Assistance (MVA) activities are 
undertaken by the Tajikistan Red Crescent Society. TMAC is supported by UNDP and the 
implementers are largely supported bilaterally, although there are occasional funding 
shortfalls. There are some gaps, particularly in the institutional framework, and it is the 
nature of evaluations to appear to dwell on these negative aspects. However in this case it is 
important to place such observations in the context of the successes, and it is hoped that these 
observations will be seen as they are meant, as constructive points intended to further 
improve the existing process.   
 
The second main point is that the contamination problem in Tajikistan can be seen in two 
distinct elements: the largest is an urgent requirement to clear the (largely) anti-personnel 
minefields in compliance with Tajikistan‟s Ottawa Convention commitments and a smaller, 
longer-term problem to deal with the residual contamination, mainly abandoned ammunition 
and unexploded ordnance (UXO) which can be expected to be found for several decades. 
Article Five of the 1997 Ottawa Convention requires states party to the convention to clear all 
known minefields in their territory within 10 years of their ratification  of the treaty. For 
Tajikistan this means completion of the clearance in 2010. It is already understood that this is 
not feasible and the question facing the Tajikstan mine action program is how to frame an 
request for an extension, which is allowed under the terns of the treaty. The finite landmine 
problem lends itself to a time-bound „project‟ whilst the open-ended nature of the UXO 
contamination suggests the need for a sustainable capacity that can be suppoted by the 
government of Tajikistan after international funding has ceased. Observations on the 
institutional framework of the mine action program and on the scoping of the problem should 
be understood in terms of this duality between these acute and chronic elements of the 




What is the actual structure of the TMAC project (DEX or NEX)? 
 
The TMAC project is described as a „nationally-executed‟ or „NEX‟ project. The Consultant 
is not an expert in UNDP constitutional issues but it is understood that to be a NEX project 
UNDP would be providing technical and/or financial assistance to a government institution. 
Alternatively UNDP undertakes DEX projects where no government capacity exists and 
where the government invites UNDP to undertake the service directly. Although TMAC 
currently operates under the aegis of the Commission for the Implementation of International 
UNDP Tajikistan Mine Action Evaluation January 2009 
RK Consulting Ltd  Page 8 
Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), given that the TMAC personnel are paid by UNDP, equipment 
and services are procured using UNDP procurement procedures, and that UNDP operates the 
bank account on behalf of the project,  TMAC appears to be exhibiting the attributes of a 
„directly executed‟ or „DEX‟ project. This „hybrid‟ approach is not unique to TMAC (it has 
been observed in at least two other mine action programs supported by UNDP) but it is 
problematic, both constitutionally for UNDP (it does not have the degree of oversight one 
might expect of a DEX project) and for the agency concerned (stakeholders do not know 
whether to treat TMAC as a government body or a UNDP project). Specifically in the case of 
TMAC, the plan under the current UNDP Country Poverty Action Plan (CPAP) is for TMAC 
to be completely „nationalised‟ by 2010
2
, which coincides with the current obligation under 
the 1997 Ottawa Convention for Tajikistan to have cleared all known anti-personnel 
minefields under its control
3
. However when interviewed it appears that there is no 
government ministry or agency able to take on TMAC in its current form.  
 
What are the implications of formalizing a DEX modality? 
 
Given that it appears impossible to fully nationalize TMAC in the time left available in the 
current CPAP and that the existing hybrid approach is unsustainable, it would appear that 
formalizing its status as a DEX project would be the most appropriate from an institutional 
perspective. This would have the advantage of clarifying the UNDP Country Office‟s role in 
the management of this project. However, formalizing TMAC‟s status as a DEX project 
appears to have two disadvantages. These are set out below. 
 
 A DEX project is „not sustainable.‟ One theme that was common in many of the 
discussions during this evaluation was that making TMAC a „DEX‟ project was 
„unsustainable‟. Whilst concerns about sustainability are understood, they are felt to be 
unwarranted in this instance, for two reasons. Firstly, as described above, the attributes of 
TMAC suggest it already is a DEX project, and indeed is already unsustainable in terms 
of the OECD criteria; if foreign funding stopped today TMAC would have to close 
tomorrow. Secondly, given the main task of TMAC is to coordinate the clearance of anti-
personnel landmines in accordance with Tajikistan‟s Ottawa obligations, the need for 
TMAC – at least in its current form – ceases with the completion of this finite task. One 
of the main requirements of a „project‟ is that it is definable and time-bound. Clearance of 
minefields is such an activity and it is therefore suitable for projectisation and operation 
using a DEX modality.   
 
 Moving to a DEX modality would be a „retrograde‟ step in terms of nationalisation. This 
argument could be made if TMAC were in fact already established within a Tajikistan 
government institution, but, as described above, this is not actually the case.  Formalising 
a DEX modality would really only be formalizing in a de jure sense what is already the 
de facto situation. There is no suggestion that the manager of the TMAC project needs to 
be internationalized, or even that a full time „Chief Technical Advisor‟ (CTA) needs to be 




                                                   
2
 See CPAP, 2005-2009, Output 11, Page 15 
3
 See Article Five of the Convention at http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text 
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Which elements of activity should remain in TMAC core business and which (if any) 
should be hived off to other agencies? 
 
TMAC has a valid role in the coordination of humanitarian mine action activities and this 
should remain its core business. It is however experimenting with a number of projects which 
it is (or intending to) implement itself. Discussions with TMAC staff suggest that some 
TMAC activities could be interpreted that some current activities by TMAC in mine risk 
education (MRE) and Mine Victim Assistance (MVA) could be interpreted as constituting 
direct implementation (though feedback from TMAC disagrees with this interpretation), At 
the time of the evaluation some initial steps being were also being taken to form an explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity to deal with unexploded ordnance (UXO) and Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (SALW) contamination
4
. Whilst all of these activities have a place in a 
mine action program, the Consultant is of the opinion that attempts to vertically-integrate the 
coordination and implementation of mine action activities would be a mistake. TMAC (and 
hence UNDP) are advised not to do this, for two reasons: 
 
 There is not sufficient capacity in TMAC to carry out the implementation of such projects 
without compromising their efficiency in their coordination of mine action, without 
significant internal investment. It is the opinion of the consultant that this investment 
would be better made in implementing agencies. 
 The second factor is that having TMAC as an implementer would blur the „separation of 
powers‟ between implementer and coordinator, especially given TMAC‟s role in quality 
assurance monitoring of mine action. If TMAC is implementing, who will do the 
monitoring? 
 
What are the options for getting more government ownership of the project now and 
in the future?  
 
As mentioned above, the government of Tajikistan has provided a focus for the institutional 
placement of TMAC under the banner of the CIIHL. It also makes some „in-kind‟ 
contributions to the mine action program. However, as also mentioned, there appears to be no 
scope to make TMAC a fully nationalized project in the time frame of the current CPAP, and 
(as will be discussed below) by the time the Government is ready to accommodate TMAC it 
will no longer be needed in its current form. There is however likely to be a longer-term 
requirement for a coordinating body to deal with residual UXO contamination and this is the 
capacity that should be encouraged within a government context. This longer-term 
requirement is discussed in more detail below; however from an institutional context it does 
appear that an early government commitment to take on full responsibility (including 
financial commitment) in the longer term for a small, residual capacity would be helpful in 
encouraging donors to commit to providing the necessary assistance in the medium term, 
particularly in light of the Ottawa commitment. 
 
 
                                                   
4
 TMAC feedback on the draft of this report says that “it has been decided and agreed among the partners that 
FSD will establish a team on EOD”. Presumably this was discussed after the evaluation as there was no mention 
of it during the assignment. Whilst the Consultant agrees that this might solve the short term UXO problem, it 
can only be a zero-sum approach as, in the short term, as it can only be done by taking resources away from 
meeting the Ottawa goal of AP landmine clearance, so in the medium term will be counter-productive. 
Furthermore, as is discussed in more detail later in this report, forming an EOD team within FSD cannot meet 
sustainability requirements. 
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Which government department may be suited? 
 
This question can be considered in two parts: 
 
 What is the best place to situate the existing TMAC capacity? 
 Where should a long-term, residual capacity be placed? 
 
In the light of the discussions above, the first of these can be discounted. Given the finite, 
time-bound nature of the anti-personnel landmine problem in Tajikistan, the current 
institutional framework, once clarified, appears to be sufficient for the time frame necessary 
to eradicate the landmine contamination.  
 
As for the long term requirement, there are technical elements within both the Ministry of 
Defence and Ministry of Interior (i.e. the Special Police) currently able to carry out landmine 
clearance and bomb disposal tasks. Whilst there may be room for further technical assistance 
to these teams neither is considered to be the most suitable focus for the development of a 
capacity able to deal with the humanitarian requirement for responding to reports of UXO 
throughout Tajikistan. The Consultant believes that the Committee for Emergency Situations 
and Civil Defence (CESCD) may be the most appropriate home for such a capacity, for the 
following reasons: 
 
 CESCD is a sustainable organisation unlike the current TMAC structure (or indeed any 
international mine action NGO or company) and the EOD requirement is likely to 
continue at a residual level for many years 
 Many of the organizational attributes for a mobile EOD capacity are also found inside 
disaster response teams, and so the provision of additional bomb disposal skills should be 
easier than forming a capacity from scratch 
 The CESCD capacity is already established in several locations throughout the country, 
with existing reporting mechanisms that would facilitate the reporting of UXO and the 
ensuing response. 
 Many donors are likely to find it easier to support a project in CESCD than they would a 
project established in one of the security forces. 
 UNDP already has an established cooperation mechanism with CESCD through its 
Disaster Risk Management Program, and this should facilitate the development of a 
capacity development project to establish a longer-term, residual capacity. 
 
What requirements are there for capacity development within TMAC? 
 
As mentioned above, TMAC is doing a good job in the coordination of the various mine 
action activities in Tajikistan. However the brief time available to this evaluation suggests 
there are three main areas where there is room for capacity development within TMAC: 
 
 Planning. There is a strategic plan in Tajikistan but it has some shortfalls. For example it 
contains a number of ideas for prioritization processes but these ideas are not connected 
within the document: the strategic plan does not say how these ideas are related or how 
they are „operationalised‟. Indeed, discussions with TMAC staff  confirm these ideas have 
not been internalized within their planning processes and tasking is done in an ad hoc 
manner. 
 
UNDP Tajikistan Mine Action Evaluation January 2009 
RK Consulting Ltd  Page 11 
 Financial and budget management. The Consultant was told that until 2007 the financial 
management of TMAC was done by the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) provided by 
UNDP. Procurement of routine equipment, services and supplies is managed through the 
UNDP procurement system, however at present TMAC does not routinely break down its 
budget into the three practical outputs of mine action and coordination overheads. Whilst 
it was possible for TMAC to do this on an ad hoc basis for the Consultant it would appear 
that more work could be done to routinely consider budget issues in this manner. 
 Mine Risk Education. There are also potential areas for development in the planning of 
MRE within the Tajikistan mine action program. These are discussed in detail below. 
 
Are there efficiency measures from including mine action under the disaster 
management portfolio within UNDP? 
 
At the time of the evaluation, the UNDP Country Office had one international and one local 
staff member each assisting with the oversight of the TMAC project on a part-time basis, plus 
assistance as required from various specialist elements within the Country Office such as the 
procurement and travel office sections. It is the opinion of the Consultant that several of the 
administrative and organizational problems within the TMAC project are as a result of this 
amount of management oversight being insufficient or possibly ineffective. It is felt that one 
person within the Country Office should have full time responsibility for the mine action 
portfolio, especially if TMAC is indeed recognized as having the attributes of a DEX project. 
In the recent structure this would require additional expense, especially if an international 
program officer were to be used. However, If TMAC is combined with the disaster 
management portfolio within the UNDP Country Office, it might be possible to obtain some 
efficiencies, with perhaps the section head being supported by two local staff desk officers, 
one looking at the conventional disaster management elements and one focusing on the mine 
action program. Communication aspects would be streamlined as both of these projects 
would be dealing with the same government department.  The disaster management project is 
also a DEX project so this would help address institutional issues of TMAC described above.  
   
What technical assistance might UNDP staff require in the future? 
 
The questions raised during the course of this evaluation highlight the problem of 
„asymmetric information‟ faced by the UNDP Country Office in terms of the specialist nature 
of humanitarian mine action, especially in technical issues. Without access to independent 
technical advice, UNDP Country Office staff will find themselves having to make judgments 
on questions where they do not have a background in the subject. Conversations with 
stakeholders also suggest that (a) the engagement of donors in the mine action program has 
not been actively sought by either UNDP or TMAC (with the exception of a conference in 
November which was widely regarded as having been useful).Many donor representatives 
reported that they had been in station for over a year before being approached for assistance. 
It appears that this rather poor effort in resource mobilization is an artifact of the hybrid 
nature of TMAC‟s current status in that both TMAC and UNDP seem to have considered this 
to have been each other‟s responsibility. Stakeholders have also reported that they would 
appreciate impartial technical advice on project proposals that they have received from 
implementers.    However, this does not mean that UNDP need take on the additional expense 
of reinstating a full-time CTA position. It may be possible for UNDP to make occasional use 
of a technical advisor on a part-time basis. This idea is developed below in the 
„Recommendations‟ section of this report. This advisor could also be used to help with the 
three main capacity development questions discussed above. 
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How should UNDP and TMAC best interface with OSCE activities in Tajikistan? 
 
One of the most complicated issues encountered in the evaluation was how UNDP and 
TMAC is currently interfacing with OSCE activities in Tajikistan. It is understood that 
relations were better in the past, but there is no doubt that there is room for improvement at 
the moment. Putting aside this relationship issue, detailed examination of the activities of 
OSCE in mine action is outside the scope of this report, but it is worth considering them in 
outline for completeness. The Consultant understands the following to be the main mine 
action activities identified for possible future support by OSCE in Tajikistan: 
 
 Support to ammunition stockpile destruction 
 Capacity development of Tajikistan landmine clearance capacity within the Ministry of 
Defence 
 Surveying of a safe path for border security patrols on the Tajik-Afghan border 
 
It is understood from senior OSCE staff that, at present, funds for these three program 
elements have not been formally approved by OSCE headquarters in Vienna.  
 
Whilst there is potential for overlap or gaps in both the first and second activities with others 
being coordinated by TMAC, these are both manageable if all organizations continue to 
observe the primary role of TMAC in coordination of such activities. However the third 
activity is potentially more serious (especially for Tajikistan‟s ability to meet its Ottawa  
Convention responsibilities, which are discussed in more detail in the following section of 
this report) for mine clearance in Tajikistan. It is understood that OSCE staff intend to take 
some of the elements of the MOD capacity currently on loan to FSD to use as a basis for their 
safe – path survey (which will not actually clear any mines and thus will not assist in meeting 
the Ottawa Convention targets). Whilst the size of this planned asset redistribution had not 
been quantified at the time of writing this report, it would appear to be at best a „zero-sum 
game‟ and at worst could potentially jeopardize the only organisation currently assisting 
Tajikistan with meeting its Ottawa Convention targets (one of the key duties of TMAC and 
hence germane to the TOR of this evaluation).  
 
It is also understood that there is some discussion in OSCE about inviting the International 
Trust Fund (ITF) to become involved in Tajikistan. Whilst the inclusion of competitive 
tendering processes such as those used by the ITF may be useful to encourage competition 
and thus help improve value for money (although this would require at least one more 
implementing agent in country to provide that competition), it is worth noting that ITF is not 
a new donor: it is merely an alternative modality for funds provided by existing donors (i.e. 
those governments who provide funds to ITF). If ITF can find a way to provide additional 
funds for Tajikistan it would be welcome, however a re-vitalised fundraising effort by UNDP 
may be sufficient, especially considering the comparatively small sums required (when 
compared to other mine action  programs. 
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Photographs 
 
These pictures have been chosen to illustrate various observations made during the 
evaluation. See the text of this report for more detailed discussion.  
 
 
Figure 3.   A benchmark for a completed 
minefield clearance task. The river beyond 
marks the border with Afghanistan.
Figure 2. Evidence of terracing on the hillside in the middle distance. Terracing is typical in areas where there 
is little flat land available for agriculture. This picture was taken on the road between Dushanbe and the Tajik-
Afghan border. 
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Figure 5. An FSD briefing map showing the different areas of their current task cleared by either full search by 
manual clearance (red), full search by dogs (yellow) and technical survey (chequerboard). 
Figure 4. A demonstration of dog 
search techniques.  
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Figure 6. A typical minefield on the Tajik-Afghan border. The undulating ground and large rocks will be 
problematic for mechanical clearance/ground preparation devices. 
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Figure 7. This Soviet minefield record, held by TMAC, is regarded as being typical of such records in 
Tajikistan and is held as being reasonably accurate. There is therefore little option for area reduction in such 
areas, particularly on the Tajik-Afghan border. 
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• Contamination  
 suspected areas:      52.522,025 m²  
                    (approximately 6,000,000 m² along Tajik Afghan 
                                        border is not surveyed yet )  
 
• Cleared:                      2,141,357 m²  
  
• Reduced SHAs:        40,850,268 m² 
• Land Release:           42,991,625 m²  
• Remaining Land:      9,530,400 m² + 6 000 000 m² un-surveyed  
                    = 15,530,400 m²  (663 SHAs & Mine Fields)  
 
Scoping the problem and exit strategy for UNDP and international 
funding 
 




The data in Box 1, provided by TMAC, sets out the amount cleared since operations began 
and shows the remaining land yet to be cleared. It does NOT include any suspect hazard areas 
on the Tajik-Uzbek border
5
. It is understood that most of the land included in the 
6,000,000m2 on the Tajik-Afghan border is in formal minefields in which land-release 
techniques might not release much land; therefore whereas by these statistics 80% of the 
other area (i.e. the 9.5 million square metres not on the Afghan border) might be subject to 
area reduction
6
, most of the areas on the Afghan border will not be reduced. 
 
In such a situation: 
 
Area requiring clearance: 6,000,000 + (9,530,400 x 20%)  =  7,906,080 m2 
 
Area released by area reduction: 9,530,400 x 80%  =  7,624,320 m2 
 
Total:        = 15,530,400 m 
 
However, in a presentation prepared by UNDP (and presumably using data from TMAC) 
dated 5 November 2008 (i.e. only 15 days before the date of the presentation referred to in 
Box 1) the total contaminated area is described as “approximately” 17,426,040 m2. The 
variance is significant in that it cannot be explained by the 15 days between the dates of these 
two presentations.  The calculations in the remainder of this report will take the variance in 
                                                   
5
 Although a cursory inspection of the map provided by TMAC suggests these are on the Uzbek side of the 
border. 
6
 This calculation was refuted by TMAC in comments on the draft of this report. TMAC reports that they 
believe that only 10-15% of the area not on the Afghan border may be suitable for further area reduction. The 
Consultant is fully prepared to accept a misunderstanding of the briefing from TMAC but this may have further 
bearing on the ability of Tajikistan being able to meet its Ottawa commitments. See discussions below. 
Box 1. Estimate of remaining clearance requirement provided by TMAC (based on TMAC presentation dated 20 
Nov 2008). 
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“Impact free” could be defined as being the 
point where there is no economic demand for 
the land left uncleared,  and where all 
reasonable and practicable steps have also 
been taken to prevent casualties in the areas 
that remain contaminated. 
this data into account. It was initially thought possible by the Consultant that part of the 
problem lies in the use of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) 
which is understood to be problematic. However it is understood that the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is helping TMAC improve the 
functionality of the IMSMA program, and feedback from TMAC states that this discrepancy 
is not due to IMSMA but was due to new data being incorporated in the interim period from 
ongoing survey data (which would suggest that the lower figure of 15m m2 was more correct. 
However the TMAC commentary contradicted itself when it went on to say that the 
EARLIER and GREATER figure of 17m m2 was correct. TMAC are encouraged to sort out 
this reporting problem. It is recommended that annual figures are used (i.e. reports issued 
throughout 2009 should say that “x million m2 were cleared as at the end of 2008”) and that 
interim updates should be avoided to avoid such confusion. 
. 
When is this expected to be cleared at current rates? 
 
In the five years of operations (i.e. 2004-2008) the total clearance (not including land release 
has been just over 2,000,000m2
7
, giving an average clearance rate of 400,000 m2 per year. 
Given the numbers set out above there is approximately 8,000,000m2 to clear (i.e. not 
including area subject to land release) this suggests there is 20 years of work to do at current 
clearance rates. However this calculation may be unfair as the clearance rates in the earlier 
years are much lower. Taking an approximate average over the last two years of 800,000m2 
per year this suggests there will be some 10 years of work to do.  If the larger figure in the 5 
November presentation is more representative then this suggests there will be some 15% 
more work to do (i.e. a total of approximately 12 years). At current clearance rates therefore 
it is impossible for Tajikistan to meet its current target of 2010 and it is unlikely that 
clearance would be completed within a 10 year extension. The current draft extension request 
being prepared by TMAC for the government of Tajikistan is intended to ask for a five year 
extension. The calculations above suggest that this is unfeasible, but there are a number of 
assumptions made by TMAC which need to be considered before this conclusion can be 
finalized. An analysis of the draft extension request is included at Annex C to this report.  
 
What are the means by which priorities for clearance are set? 
 
As mentioned above, the strategic plan
8
 has a number of possible prioritization mechanisms 
but does not provide guidance on how they inter-relate or how they can be used. The 
Consultant understands from discussions with TMAC staff that prioritization is currently 
done on an ad-hoc basis. Whilst this apparently involves consultation with local authorities 
the lack of clear criteria means the process is not able to be evaluated. The Consultant 
recommends the development of objective and quantitative criteria for allocating priorities. 
 
What is the significance of an ‘impact free’ interim target for Tajikistan? 
 
In the context of the Ottawa Convention an 
“Impact Free status, as defined in Box 2, is an 
interim target on the way to the full clearance 
requirement as described in Article Five of the 
treaty. One implication of an Impact Free target is 
                                                   
7
 Actual figure is 2,141,357 m² (Source TMAC presentation dated 20 Nov 08) 
8
  Five-year strategy For the Tajikistan National Mine Action Programme ver 2.0 dated 6 April 2006 
Box 2. A possible definition of „impact free‟. 
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that it is more easily to combine in an holistic manner with general humanitarian and 
development targets. Discussions with donor representatives in Dushanbe suggest that it 
would be easier for individual donors to support landmine clearance that has a direct impact 
on the population than the clearance of those mines that might not make an impact at present. 
Clearly it makes sense for clearance of those minefields that have the most impact to be 
cleared first. Discussions also suggest that if donors were told that the government of 
Tajikistan undertook to pay for the clearance of these  non-impact minefields at the end of the 
clearance program it would help them (the donors) justifying funding the clearance of the 
higher-impact areas. The definition of what constitutes „impact‟ free in the context of 
Tajikistan needs to be developed with a „scoping‟ exercise, using a form of standard cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) techniques
9
. Discussion about how to set these principles out in a 
program is set out below. 
 
How can ‘urgent’ (or ‘acute’) landmine clearance needs be combined with dealing 
with ‘long term’ (or ‘chronic’) needs for an explosive ordnance disposal/SALW 
capacity?  
 
To use a medical metaphor, the anti-personnel landmine problem in Tajikistan can be 
considered as an „acute‟ problem that requires immediate, short term attention to deal with a 
finite problem. However, experience from other areas of former conflict we can expect to see 
a longer term (or „chronic‟) problem from unexploded ordnance (UXO) and small arms and 
light weapons (SALW). Experience in Europe suggests that this chronic problem can last for 
decades. One can imagine caches of abandoned ammunition or isolated finds of unexploded 
ordnance turning up in former areas of conflict in Tajikistan for some time to come. 
 
Economists define „the short term‟ as “the period before changes can be made to the current 
production line” and in that sense the current structures in Tajikistan are suitable for dealing 
with the acute problem of anti-personnel communication in the short to medium term, where 
we might define „short term‟ as the period covered by the current CPAP (which is concurrent 
with the current Ottawa Convention deadline) and „medium term‟ as the period required 
within an Ottawa Convention extension to deal with the remaining anti-personnel landmine 
contamination. Similarly, „long term‟ can be used to describe the activities needed to deal 
with the UXO threat. 
 
As stated above, the current structures are suitable for dealing with the anti-personnel 
landmine problem, but there is a capability gap in dealing with the long term UXO problem. 
Both of these issues can be addressed concurrently but the UXO problem will certainly 
outlast the landmine problem, especially if resources continue to be provided to meet Ottawa 
Convention landmine removal targets. This raises questions of sustainability which are 
addressed below. 
 
                                                   
9
 Existing documentation makes the point that the landmine contamination has an economic impact by denying 
access to the limited available terrain suitable for agricultural production in Tajikistan. However the 
documentation does not quantify this problem. A scoping exercise would compare the cost of clearance with the 
potential benefit of releasing land and identify which types of land would be worth clearing at current costs, and 
also which land would be worth clearing if costs could be reduced. 
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How can the scoping concept be reconciled with institutional framework issues 
considered above? 
 
Actually, the finite nature to the landmine contamination problem provides a solution to the 
institutional problems described above. Because the landmine problem is finite (and largely 
defined) there is no need to form or maintain a sustainable landmine clearance capacity. 
Sustainability (in the OECD definitions set out above) is achieved from the sustained future 
use of the land once it is cleared. Priority of clearance should therefore be aimed at clearing 
land that suffering the most impact from the contamination. This means also that there is no 
need to maintain either TMAC (at least in its current form) beyond the time needed to clear 
the mines, so there is no particular need to seek a home for TMAC within a government 
ministry or agency: it could be maintained as a UNDP project under the aegis of a 
government agency in very much the same way as it is now (with the appropriate UNDP 
oversight of a DEX project mentioned above. 
 
In the same way, given the finite clearance requirement the work currently being undertaken 
by FSD (essentially as a contractor) there is no need to develop a sustainable landmine 
clearance capacity in any greater sophistication than that already achieved in order to meet 
Ottawa Convention targets in Tajikistan. There may be a need to expand capacity to meet 
targets, but this is a separate issue and is discussed in Annex C in the context of meeting 
Ottawa Convention targets. This means that clearance activities can also be undertaken as 
projects. There is a potential role for UNDP to re-vitalize its fund-raising elements for such 
implementation projects within a  mine action program portfolio, using its cost-sharing 
agreement modalities to establish a form of local trust fund. Experience from other mine 
action programs suggests that, in order for UNDP to be an attractive vector for such funding 
it must show that it provides a „value added‟ service. The recommendations for development 
of the institutional framework set out below, especially in terms of providing impartial advice 
to donors on the requirements and establishment of mechanisms to provide technical and 
financial oversight, should largely address the requirements to make a UNDP portfolio 
attractive. Improvements in the proactive engagement of stakeholders by UNDP would also 
assist. 
 
Projectization of TMAC and of clearance activities therefore deals with the landmine 
contamination problem, but what of the longer time requirement? It would be possible to 
conduct a „train and equip‟ project (often described as a „build operate train and transfer 
(BOTT) project) to procure equipment, provide formal training and continuation („on the 
job‟) training to an EOD capacity (located within CESCD). It would be possible to establish a 
clear, mutually-agreed handover for funding purposes whereby the government of Tajikistan 
would agree to take on the continued, recurrent costs of this capacity in the longer term once 
the training is complete.  
 
Recommendations for separate projects within future mine action portfolios 
 
These activities could again be projectized within a portfolio of projects which could also 
include mine victim assistance and mine risk education projects implemented by the 
Tajikistan Red Crescent Society). It may also be possible to conduct other projects in parallel 
within the portfolio. For example, it may be possible to arrange train and equip an military 
demining team within the MOD to be made available for assistance in demining for United 
Nations peacekeeping operations. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
has previously coordinated such programs in Sudan. 
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Figure 8. The „hump‟ concept shows how different projects can be combined to deal with mid-term needs plus 
the establishment of a sustainable capacity to deal with residual contamination in the longer term. 
 
 
It is possible to depict the structure of such a portfolio graphically, with the medium term 
activities being represented by a „hump‟ and the sustainable, residual capacity represented by 
a „tail‟. This „hump‟ concept has been tested in a number of other mine action programs by 
the Consultant in the last year and is described below. 
 
The ‘hump’ concept 
 










Figure 8 above shows how the different requirements could be combined in an overall 
program. The key elements are described below: 
 
1. Training and equipping phase for a sustainable capacity to deal with residual 
contamination, built and operated with donor support  
2. Continued operation of the sustainable residual capacity using Tajik resources 
3. One of a number of different mine action projects (FSD and other operators) operated in 
the mid term with donor support. 
4. The „hump‟ defines the total requirement of the program in terms of overall resources, 
based on an objective scoping exercise (such as the one outlined in this evaluation). 
5. The point at which donor funding ceases. This is the basis for an „exit strategy‟ for 
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6. Pre-cursor activities necessary to establish the hump concept. 
 
The „hump‟ concept of projectization also allows for the potential of using other demining 
organizations additional to FSD to compete for funds if calculations suggest that more 
resources are needed to meet clearance targets. Competition may be important as a way of 
improving value for money and/or encouraging further donor support. 
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Technical survey and land release techniques 
 
The achievement of increased productivity in recent years depends on the efficacy of recent 
techniques by FSD in the areas of land release and technical survey. Meeting Ottawa targets 
with existing resource levels depend on their use. However, both of these concepts involve 
removing (parts of) SHA from the database without subjecting them to full clearance and 
both of these techniques can be controversial in the humanitarian mine action community. 
The safety and suitability of these techniques (as used and documented in Tajikistan) will be 
reviewed by the Consultant and recommendations made if necessary. 
 
There are two main types of techniques being used in Tajikistan. The first, and most effective 
in terms of area processed, is described as „land release‟. This is an analytical process to 
remove land that has been included in the original survey process
10
 that identified suspect 
hazard areas (SHA) but that has been in continuous use by the local population, where there 
have been no casualties and where there are no other indications of contamination. It is 
essentially a refinement of the original survey process. The land release technique has been 
increasingly in use since first being suggested in Cambodia in 2004
11
 and there is some 
literature on the process. The Consultant finds that there is no problem with this process in 
Tajikistan; however it is nearly complete and will not be usable against the recorded 
minefields on the Tajik-Afghan border. 
 
The second technique is referred to as „technical survey‟. Technical survey is a controversial 
issue in international mine action, not least because there is no standard taxonomy to define 
and differentiate between the various techniques that are each described as „technical survey‟ 
at present. However the common theme in all discussions of technical survey is the aspiration 
to more tightly define the perimeter of SHA identified by the original survey. 
 
There are three issues with the technical survey as conducted by FSD in Tajikistan. The first 
of these is that it is based on a grid sampling pattern that covers approximately 20% of the 
SHA. This may be effective in identifying the perimeter of formal minefields (where the 
mines are laid in defined patterns) but it would appear largely unnecessary in circumstances 
where good minefield records exist (such as the Russian-laid minefields on the Tajik-Afghan 
border). On the other hand, where mines are laid without a pattern the statistical confidence 
in the results appears more problematic, especially where the density of such contamination is 
low. There appears to have been no scientific design behind the technical survey and as such 




The second problem with the technical survey techniques being used in Tajikistan is the 
amount of effort required to set out the 20% grid pattern. Discussions with FSD field staff 
suggest that whilst technical survey is faster than a full search pattern, the amount of effort to 
set out the grid means that it is only 10-15% faster. Given the greater confidence from full 
search, it is difficult to see the justification for the technical survey technique. 
                                                   
10
 The technique commonly used to establish the existence of contamination is referred to as „landmine impact 
survey‟ and is based on social science techniques similar to participatory rural appraisal. As such it is 
comparatively inaccurate and it only produces approximate boundaries. 
11
 See http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/evaluations/database/Cambodia/Mine_Action_Evaluation_2004_volume1.pdf 
12
 It is understood that there have been no casualties in areas „released‟ by technical survey techniques in 
Tajikistan. However this could be because (a) there were no mines in the area to begin with or (b) there is no 
demand for the land that has been released. 
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Thirdly, the most efficient search technique in Tajikistan appears to be the use of dogs. 
However the current processes (as demonstrated to the Consultant by FSD) involve the use of 
a unit of two dogs directly supported by one deminer. Whilst one dog is working, the other 
dog (and the deminer) are not, and when the deminer is checking an indication by one of the 
dogs, neither of the dogs are working. An adjustment of working processes to allow all three 
of these to work in echelon should make their use more efficient, and might make full search 
by dogs as fast as the 20% technical survey search grid, without the concerns about the 
statistical confidence described above. 
   
The potential for a shift of focus for Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
 
There is an existing MRE program in Tajikistan, with most activities conducted by the 
Tajikistan Red Crescent (TRC) Society. It is understood that a range of MRE activities have 
been undertaken, including mass media, community based presentations and school based 
presentations (supported in the past by UNICEF).  There is also a coordination capacity in 
TMAC consisting of one UNDP-employed person and two TRC staff members. There has 
been no attempt to assess the efficiency and impact of the various activities. In order to do 
this it would be necessary to undertake some benchmarking activities, using established 
techniques such as „knowledge. Attitudes and Practices‟ (KAP) surveys to identify what, if 
any, effect has been made by the existing MRE activities on casualty numbers in Tajikistan 
and which interventions have been the most cost-effective.   
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Overall, the TMAC project is going well and has achieved much of the goals that might be 
expected of a mine action coordinating body. The evaluation has identified some positive 
aspects of the project, including the following: 
 
 A coordination process is established in TMAC and communications are going well with 
most stakeholders at a technical level 
 
 The landmine problem in Tajikistan is largely quantified and it is possible to estimate 
how long it will take to clear it. 
 
 Clearance work is already underway through a partnership between the Tajikistan 
Ministry of Defence and the Swiss Demining Federation (FSD) 
 
 Mine Risk Education (MRE) and Mine Victim Assistance (MVA) projects have been 
established and activities in both of these sub-sectors are under way. 
 
 Work is already underway to plan for extension to Ottawa Convention targets 
 
 Donors appear to be supportive and have stated their willingness to receive new project 
proposals. 
 
However, there are also some shortfalls in the mine action program in Tajikistan.  
 
 Tajikistan is not able to meet Ottawa Convention targets without extension of the original 
2010 deadline. 
 
 There is limited government ownership of the problem, and this is exemplified by the fact 
there is little or no government cash contribution to the program 
 
 There are insufficient discussions with donors, which is significant given the resource 
shortfalls 
 
 There is limited capacity in TMAC planning, though there is a positive attitude and a 
desire to learn more amongst all TMAC staff 
 
 The impact of contamination is understood on a qualitative level but it has not been 
quantified and hence it is not possible to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Donors have 
said that they would be better able to solicit support from their own headquarters if they 
could set the landmine contamination issue into a holistic, developmental context.  
 
 No long term EOD capacity has been established. Whilst it is likely that the requirement 
will be small, it will still be necessary. 
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 There is lack of access to external technical assistance. Whilst the size of the TMAC 
project and the existing skill levels suggest that it would not be necessary to revert to 
having a full time technical advisor, there are still areas where capacity needs to be 
developed. Furthermore, the staff of the UNDP Country Office need access to impartial 
technical advice, especially in scrutinizing proposals for expansion of the program and in 
procurement of specialist technical equipment and services. 
 
 TMAC is getting involved in direct implementation of MRE and MVA projects, and has 
also attempted to form its own EOD capacity, which has only halted because of confusion 
between UNDP and OSCE over a joint SALW project. This direct implementation blurs 
the lines between  monitoring and implementation functions, which should be separate. 
 
 Communications with OSCE are not as good as they once were. This has been ascribed 
by OSCE to the lack of a technical advisor (see above) but, whatever the cause, there are 
implications in ensuring that Tajikistan optimizes its resources towards meeting its 
Ottawa Convention obligations. 
 
These observations are summarised in a SWOT analysis in Table 2 below 
 
Table 2: SWOT Analysis of Tajikistan mine action program 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Coordination process established in TMAC 
 Landmine problem largely quantified 
 Clearance work underway 
 MRE and MVA projects established 
 Work underway to plan for extension to 
Ottawa Convention targets 
 Tajikistan not able to meet Ottawa 
Convention targets without extension 
 Limited government ownership 
 No government cash contribution 
 Insufficient discussions with donors 
 Limited capacity in TMAC planning 
 Impact of contamination has not been 
quantified 
 No long term EOD capacity established 
 Lack of access to external technical 
assistance 
Opportunities Threats 
 Donors appear interested in helping 
Tajikistan deal with significant part of 
problem 
 Donors appear interested in establishment 
of capacity to deal with long term UXO 
problem if government commits to take on 
later funding 
 TMAC involvement in direct implementation 
threatens to damage  role as coodinator 
 Relations between UNDP, TMAC and OSCE 
need to be improved 
 OSCE plans to remove assets from FSD may 
threaten plans to meet Ottawa Convention 
targets 
 
 Conclusions of analysis of Ottawa extension 
 
The table at Annex C shows a set of calculations used to assess the validity of the current 
TMAC/FSD plans in support of a 5 year extension request for Tajikistan. The calculations 
support the estimates of TMAC and FSD that current capacity will take at least 12 years to 
complete the task. The analysis also shows that purchasing a machine is more cost-effective 
than spending an equivalent amount of money on an expanded manual capacity. This 
estimate is quite robust as halving the estimated cost of an expanded manual capacity is still 
more expensive than the purchase of a machine. 
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However the findings in Annex C differ in one important request to those being used at 
present in Tajikistan; this is in the estimate of how long it will take for a machine and manual 
combination to complete the task. The calculations based on the TMAC/FSD estimate 
suggests that the machine must be able to be used on at least 60% of the mined areas. The 
observations of the Consultant (admittedly based on a short field trip) suggest this is very 
optimistic. This finding is supported by estimates by TMAC personnel that the machine will 
only be usable on 20% of the terrain. If this is true then the amount of time required extends 
until just under 10 years.  
 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the TMAC/FSD plan is based on a whole series 
of assumptions, including the amount of land that the machine will be able to process in one 
day and the amount of downtime that the machine will incur. Discussions with FSD also 
confirm that the machine will need to be followed by a manual clearance team to prove the 
processed ground. The cost of this small manual team is included in the FSD cost estimates 
but the team will need to work several times faster than the established capacity in order to 
keep up with the machine. This is not possible unless FSD are allowed to adopt a sampling 
technique to check this cleared land. This is again quite a controversial concept at present. 
 
A copy of the table at Annex C has been provided separately so that variations in the 
planning figures can be modeled. All of these assumptions are serial in effect; the 
calculations of productivity are simple mathematical products of the baseline planning figures 
and thus a reduction of one or an increase of the other is translated directly into an effect on 
the „bottom line‟. From a risk management perspective this is quite significant as all the 
assumptions are „single points of failure‟. A failure in one assumption (such as the amount of 
downtime) will mean an extension, possibly a significant one, in the amount of time required. 
Given that the TMAC/FSD plan is already “a close run thing” it is likely that an extension of 
five years will probably not be sufficient.  
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Recommendations 
 
As a result of the evaluation, a number of recommendations can be made, These are set out as 
bullet points below for ease of reference and are grouped within the four categories used 




 TMAC should be recognized by UNDP as a DEX project, provided with the appropriate 
level of oversight and included within the Country Office team dealing with disaster 
management portfolio. This should be seen in the light of the scoping concept discussed 
in this evaluation and the recommendations made on the scoping of the program set out 
below. 
 
 UNDP should consider the establishment of improved cost-sharing agreement processes 
to raise money and act as a local trust fund to support the portfolio of projects suggested 
within the recommendations on scoping below, to operate alongside bilateral funding 
arrangements developed by implementing agents. 
 
 UNDP should encourage the government to commit to take on the „downstream‟ costs of 
the mine action program, as set out in the scoping recommendations below. 
 
 UNDP should establish a local staff post for a full time project officer as a single point of 
contact for the TMAC project. 
 
 UNDP should arrange to provide periodic technical assistance to deal with three main 
capacity shortfalls (i.e. strategic and technical planning, budget planning and 
programming of MRE) and provide independent technical advice to the UNDP Country 
Office and other stakeholders. There is no need to re-establish a full-time CTA post. 
 
 UNDP should encourage OSCE to support its border survey project through the provision 
of additional resources to the Tajikistan Ministry of Defence, rather than through the 
reallocation of resources currently provided to FSD to clear landmines in support of 
Tajikistan‟s Ottawa Convention commitments. 
 
Scoping the problem and exit strategy for UNDP and international funding 
 
 The government of Tajikistan and all other stakeholders in the mine action program are 
encouraged to recognise that the landmine and UXO problem in Tajikistan can be divided 
into two distinct components:\ 
 
o The clearance of minefields in support of Ottawa Convention commitments 
o Removal of items of abandoned ammunition and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as 
these are discovered and reported 
 
 Stakeholders should also recognise that whilst the first of these can be measured, defined 
and thus treated as a finite „project,‟ experience in Western Europe shows that a small 
residual capacity will be needed to deal with UXO for decades to come. 
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 The data on the minefields needs to be cleaned up and one standard set of information 
used for briefing purposes. The further assistance of GICHD in developing the 
effectiveness of the IMSMA information management system should be encouraged. 
 
 It is the opinion of the Consultant that there are too many risks associated with the 
planning of future clearance in Tajikistan to commit to clearance within five years. It is 
therefore recommended that Tajikistan should ask for a 10 year extension. 
 
 As a way of spreading the risks, Tajikistan should consider inviting a second international 
agency to operate in parallel with FSD to encourage competition and optimize value for 
money, especially if calculations showing that Tajikistan may not meet Ottawa 
Convention targets within the timeframe of a single extension period are confirmed. 
 
 Some donors have expressed interest in helping Tajikistan clear those mined areas that 
can be shown to have a quantifiable impact on the local population. In order to do this it 
is recommended that a scoping study be undertaken. The study should use cost-benefit 
analysis techniques to compare the potential agricultural benefit from cleared land to the 
costs of clearance. Clearance of land that would have a positive benefit would help 
Tajikistan become „impact free‟ as an intermediate stage towards a mine-free end state. 
 
 It is recommended that a project be initiated to train and equip a mobile EOD capacity 
within CESCD with the ability to respond to reports of isolated caches of abandoned 
ammunition and UXO.  A feasibility study should be conducted to confirm the 
appropriate size of such a capacity and the resource requirements. 
 
 A possible role for Tajikistan MOD deminers within UN peacekeeping missions should 
be investigated. 
 
 The completion of clearance of those mined areas which have an impact on local 
communities, plus the establishment of a sustainable mobile EOD capacity, should be 
recognized as the main exit point for international involvement in mine action in 
Tajikistan and the end date for the UNDP TMAC project. 
 
 The government of Tajikistan is encouraged to take on the subsequent costs of getting 
Tajikistan from „impact free‟ to „mine free‟.  
 
 The government of Tajikistan should be encouraged to accept responsibility for funding 
of this EOD capacity once training is complete 
 
Technical survey and land release techniques 
 
 The use of land release techniques to remove land currently included in the suspect 
hazard areas (SHA) but that is in constant use by the local population, where no casualties 
have been sustained and where there are no other direct indicators of landmine 
contamination is endorsed. 
 
 The use of sampling as an area reduction technique in areas where there are direct 
indicators of landmine or UXO contamination is regarded as problematic and its use 
should be re-Examined. Similarly, the current procedures used in the handling of mine 
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detecting dogs (MDD) may be inefficient. It may be that some changes in the MDD 
working practices could make full dog search as fast as the current sampling technique. It 
is therefore recommended that Tajikistan hosts a workshop  on technical survey 
techniques to establish which changes, if any, should be made to their existing techniques. 
 
The potential for a shift of focus and scope for Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
 
 Work conducted by the Tajikistan Red Crescent in MRE (and MVA) is recognized and 
both should be encouraged to continue as bilateral projects within the overall mine action 
program in Tajikistan. 
 
 TMAC should not get involved in direct implementation of MRE (or MVA) projects And 
should concentrate on the coordination and monitoring of these activities. 
 
 One question that needs to be addressed in MRE is establishing how much intervention is 
actually required.  TMAC should undertake a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) 
study to determine the level of knowledge in the population and the best intervention for 
delivery of information and modifying behavior.  
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Annex A. Key documentation 
 
 
UNDP Tajikistan Mine Action Evaluation January 2009 
RK Consulting Ltd  Page 33 




Delegation of the European Commission 
British Embassy 
Swedish International Development Agency 





UNDP Country Office 
International Committee of the Red Cross 




Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law 
Ministry of Defence 




Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) 
Swiss Demining Foundation (FSD) 
Takikistan Red Crescent Society
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Annex C. Analysis of TMAC draft Ottawa extension request 
 
Analysis of Tajikistan Ottawa Extension Plans (FSD) 
Ser Description Quantity Unit Remarks 
(a) (b) (c ) (d) (e) 
Manual Clearance rates 
1 Clearance Rate 30 m2 man/day 
2 Clearance rate (FSD total) 700000 m2 year 
3 Amount cleared by Tech Survey 40%     
4 Amount cleared by demining 60%     
5 Amount left at beginning of 2010 3,500,000 m2   
6 Amount cleared by Tech Survey 1,000,000     
7 Amount left to clear 2,500,000     
8 Amount in Afghan border minefields 6,000,000     
9 Remaining amount 8,500,000     
10 Time required 12.1 years   
 
Note: the initial assumptions used for these calculations were provided by FSD. The implications of variance in the initial assumptions are 
discussed in the main text of the report. A copy of the spreadsheet in which the calculations can be observed has been provided separately to the 
UNDP Country Office.
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Effect of Introducing machine 
11 No of days worked per month 24 days (Same as present) 
12 No of hours machine works per day 6 hours   
13 Average productivity 1000 m2/day   
14 No of months in work season 9     
15 Maximum Amount processed per year          1,296,000  m2/year   
16 Downtime factor 20%     
17 Expected amount processed per year          1,036,800    by machine 
18 Total processed (manual and machine)          1,736,800      
19 Total processed by machine over whole time          5,074,159      
20 Total cleared manually over whole time          3,425,841      
21 Time required                       4.9  Years   
22 Checksum          8,500,000    should equal F21 
23 Assumes machine can work on at least  60%     
Effect of unsuitable terrain 
24 Max area clearable by machine 20%     
25 Max area clearable by machine (m2)          1,700,000  m2   
26 Area needed to be cleared by manual          6,800,000      
27 Time needed with current capacity                       9.7  years   
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Alternative Assumption: spend money on more manual capacity 
28 Current clearance rate 700000 m2/year   
29 Forecast manual time required 12.1 years   
30 percentage increase 25%     
31 increased manual clearance rate 875000 m2/year   
32 new time required                       9.7  years   
33 Cost of current capacity          1,500,000    per year 
34 cost of capacity over new length of project        14,571,429      
35 Estimated purchase cost of machine Year 1 500000     
36 Estimated operating costs over length of project              327,932    with machine, will vary depending on suitability (A27) 
37 Total machine costs over 5 years              827,932      
38 Cost of larger manual capacity    18,214,285.7    Conservative estimate 
39 Cost of current capacity plus machine     15,399,360.7      
40 percentage difference from using machine 85%     
 
The first section of the table above shows the likely time for completion of targets based on current performance data provided by FSD. It 
confirms estimates in the main body of the report that this will be 12 years at current rates.  
 
The second section of the table shows the effect of introducing a machine that can be used on at least 60% of the terrain. Su ch a machine can 
reduce the clearance time required to just under 5 years with all assumptions intact (assumptions are marked in yellow).   
 
The third section shows the implications of the terrain not being so suitable. If the machine can only be used on 20% of the terrain (based on a 
TMAC estimate) then the remainder must be done by the slower, manual technique. This extends the time required to just under 10 years (which 
is, incidentally, the amount of time possible under an extension of the Ottawa Convention).   
 
The fourth section shows the implications of spending the money on a machine on simply expanding the current manual capacity to a size able to 
meet a 10 year target. Even if the machine can only work on 20% of terrain, the machine is still more cost effective; its cost is 85% of an 
expanded manual project.   The assumptions are discussed in the main text of the report. 
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Annex D. Description of a possible scoping exercise 
 
Whilst it is comparably easy to come up with a qualitative definition of an „impact free‟ 
landmine contamination status, i.e. where the population can go about their lives free from 
the risk of injury from landmines, it is slightly more complicated to quantify when such a 
point would be reached. 
 
Use of economic measures is one way to quantify an „impact free‟ status, which is useful as 
an intermediate stage on the way to achieving a „mine free‟ result and helps determine the 
most urgent phase of clearance. Under an economic paradigm it is possible to define „impact 
free‟ in the context of pollution abatement principles, by identifying the point where the 
marginal benefit of clearance is equal to the marginal cost.  
 
This can be done by taking the yield and market prices of staple crops and thus identifying 
the net value of agricultural land per square metre; this value is then extrapolated out over the 
life of potential contamination and controlled for the effect of time on future values to 
identify the benefit of clearing different types of  land. 
 
Area clearance costs are calculated by removing the elements of program budgets applicable 
to other interventions (i.e. mobile EOD teams, MRE and MVA) to identify the cost per 
square metre. All land whose potential benefit is greater or equal to the cost of clearance is 
considered to be land where the contamination has an „impact‟. It is then possible to identify 
(a) what resources would be necessary to meet a specific end date or (b) calculate a likely end 
date based on specified levels of resources. 
 
The Consultant has developed a series of tools to assist in these (and other mine action 
program design) calculations, which have been tested in Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan and 
Angola. The tools were „operationalised‟ by the Consultant in a project supported by the US 
Department of State and coordinated by the Survey Action Center.
13
   
 
Cost data can be extracted from the mine action program: agricultural data is typically 
obtained from WFP and/or FAO data sources and the spatial data is achieved by overlaying 
the landmine contamination map with land use mapping, with the assistance of a GIS 
specialist (normally the IMSMA specialist in the mine action centre). 
 
Most time is spent tracking down the data from the various sources. Once the data is obtained 
the calculations typically take a week to process;  
  
                                                   
13
 See http://www.sac-na.org/res_pubs_EDSTools.html 
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Annex E. Description of a possible EOD project 
 
Concept of operations 
 
As stated in the main body of this report, the concept is the establishment of a mobile EOD 
capacity in Tajikistan able to deal with reports of isolated caches of abandoned ammunition 
and items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in areas of former conflict in Tajikistan. The EOD 
capacity does not have to be able to undertake area clearance of landmines as this 
requirement is dealt with by other existing teams already established in Tajikistan. Nor does 
the EOD capacity have to deal with improvised explosive devices (IED) or other criminal use 
of explosives, as these are the responsibility of the Special Police within the Ministry of 
Interior. 
 
The initial plan is to place this EOD capacity within the CESCD organisation. This would 
enable the EOD capacity to make best use of the reporting mechanisms. The question is to 
what extent the existing CESCD infrastructure can be used to support this new capacity and 
to what extent new resources need to be provided  To that end a feasibility study needs to be 
undertaken to quantify the requirement. 
 
It is intended that the capacity will be developed using a „train and equip‟ modality, whereby 
an international agency would be used to provide equipment, provide formal training, and 
then to provide continuation training through “on the job” guidance. Once the on the job 
training is complete, the responsibility for funding the teams would be formally handed over 
to the government of Tajikistan. 
 
The teams will be placed in CESCD because of the need for sustainability; because of the 
need to ensure the train and equip methodology is efficient it is intended to contract in a 
suitable international agency to provide the training and equipment. It is intended to identify 
the training agency through UNDP competitive tendering processes. 
 
Tasks of the feasibility study 
 
The teaks of the feasibility study are set out below. 
 
 Determine how many teams would be needed to meet reasonable callout requirements 
taking into account the geography of Tajikistan, the location of current CESCD facilities 
and organizational structures and the areas of former conflict. 
 Spend time with the organizational headquarters of CESCD in Dushanbe in order to 
understand their procedures and how an EOD capacity can best fit in with these existing 
processes. 
 Visit the field locations of CESCD in the areas of former conflict and make an assessment 
of what additional infrastructure and equipment, if any, is needed to host an EOD 
capacity. 
 Assess the current structure of the CESCD capacity to confirm whether the EOD capacity 
can be achieved by dual training of existing disaster response rescue units, whether 
wholly new teams need to be raised or if an augmentation of existing units is necessary. 
 Establish organizational framework between the EOD capacity and TMAC in its role as 
coordinator of mine action activities in Tajikistan 
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 Develop a table of equipment for the EOD capacity, taking into account the number of 
teams, technical role of the capacity and existing CESCD infrastructure 
 Plan for the formal training requirement and on-the job training requirement to be 
provided by the implementing agency. 
 Plan for the development of a train the trainer component to allow the EOD capacity to be 
technically self-sustaining once international technical assistance has been withdrawn. 
This should include a review of any existing EOD training capacity in Tajikistan. 
 Develop an indicative budget for the establishment of a BOTT-type project to be 
conducted by an international organisation with previous experience in similar projects 
 Formally confirm willingness of CESCD to host this capacity and to undertake to provide 
funding for its continued operations once training is complete  
 Use these initial plans to construct tender documentation to allow UNDP to issue a 
Request for Proposals to potential implementers, including an organizational chart, 
outline works plan and logical framework diagram and indicative budget for use by 
UNDP in resource mobilization and evaluation of responses to the RFP.  
 Assist UNDP in resource mobilization amongst the donor community in Tajikistan. 
 Assist UNDP in the technical evaluation of responses to the RFP. 
 
Resource requirements for the feasibility study 
 
It is expected that the feasibility study will take approximately four weeks in country (see 
qualifications section below), with approximately 30% of that time spent on field trips to the 
regions. There will need to be regular access to a suitably equipped, rugged 4x4 vehicle and 
driver. An additional week should be available if necessary to complete the writing up of 
project documentation. Time should also be allowed to assist the UNDP Country Office with 
a desk review of proposals from interested agencies. A week should be sufficient – again this 
can be done from home rather than requiring a second visit. 
  
Qualifications for the feasibility study 
 
The feasibility study needs to be carried out by a consultant with practical experience in 
setting up a mobile EOD organisation in a post-conflict environment, including both 
technical and institutional issues (such as budget development). They need a formal EOD 
qualification and should be familiar with UNDP mine action programs. Previous experience 




It will be possible to monitor the performance of the training agency by comparing it with the 
project documentation, particularly the logical framework. UNDP should be able to do this as 
part of the technical assistance provided to TMAC discussed elsewhere in the main body of 
this report.    
